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AN ORIGINALISM FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 
INGRID WUERTH* 
Originalism and foreign affairs are both popular topics of current scholarly 
inquiry.  Much of the recent work on foreign affairs1 focuses on history, but it 
generally does not fully engage debates on originalism as a method of modern 
constitutional interpretation.2  Most scholarship that defends originalism as a 
methodology has said little explicitly about how it relates to foreign affairs: 
this literature is replete with references to cases such as Roe v. Wade3 and 
 
* Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School, Ingrid.wuerth@vanderbilt.edu.  For helpful 
comments, thanks to Randy Barnett, Mark Brandon, Chris Bryant, Jacob Cogan, Mike Ramsey, 
Suzanna Sherry, Larry Solum, Suja Thomas, and David Zaring, and to the participants in the 
University of Georgia International Law Colloquium, particularly Dan Bodansky and Harlan 
Cohen.  I am grateful to David Sloss for organizing the symposium at which this paper was 
presented, to Eugene Kontorovich and Stephen Vladeck for their thoughtful responses, and to 
participants in the symposium for their comments and questions. 
 1. Foreign affairs, as I am using the term here, includes war power and war prosecution; the 
focus is on the constitutional aspects of foreign affairs law. 
 2. There is a considerable body of foreign affairs scholarship that makes claims about the 
substance of the Constitution’s original meaning.  There is little work, by contrast, from foreign 
affairs scholars that explicitly adopts (or rejects) originalism as a method of interpretation.  
Examples of work analyzing originalism in foreign affairs include GARY LAWSON & GUY 
SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY 7–13 (2004); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 24–25 (2005); Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. 
Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a 
Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450 (2006) (book review) [hereinafter 
Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs].  Other foreign affairs scholarship that 
considers the place of history in modern constitutional interpretation includes David M. Golove, 
Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998) (responding to Laurence H. 
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995)); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War 
Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1548–69 (2002); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at 
Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2162–68 (1999); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding 
Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845 (1996) (book 
review). 
 3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Brown v. Board of Education,4 but look in vain for discussions of 
Youngstown,5 Dames & Moore,6 or the President’s power to initiate war.7 
This symposium contribution began with what seemed like a simple 
enough question: What does originalism require in the area of foreign affairs?  
One answer is that originalism requires historical inquiry, and indeed, much 
has been written on the original understanding of the Executive Vesting 
Clause, the Declare War Clause, the treaty power, and so on.  But I mean the 
question in a different way, or at least to start in a somewhat different place: 
What are the normative reasons in favor of originalism, and how do they apply 
in the area of foreign affairs? 
This Article describes several normative arguments for originalism and 
then attempts to apply them to foreign affairs.  It contends that these arguments 
are at best underdeveloped and at worst weak when it comes to many 
constitutional issues that arise in the foreign affairs area.  First, originalism is 
still largely a theory about how courts should behave, but a significant portion 
of foreign affairs issues are resolved by the Executive Branch and Congress, 
not the courts.  It is sometimes unclear why the political branches themselves 
are bound by original meaning and how interpretation by the political branches 
is related to interpretation by judges.  Second, and consistent with its focus on 
judicial review and individual rights, originalism appears at times to have little 
to say about the relationship between executive and congressional power, 
including if and how the courts should mediate this relationship.  Third, 
pragmatic or consequentialist justifications for originalism are potentially weak 
in the area of foreign affairs, particularly given the profound changes over time 
in the Presidency as an office, the military and economic strength of the United 
States, the conduct of war, and the content of international law.  Finally, 
 
 4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  But see MICHAEL D. 
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 51–114 (2007) (evaluating 
Youngstown based on history and original understanding); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown 
Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 229–30 (2002) (defending Justice Black and Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown opinions partially on originalist grounds). 
 6. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  But see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1622–23 (1989) (describing 
Dames & Moore as an opinion that seems to “flatly . . . contradict many of the premises of 
originalism that are incompatible with nonoriginalism”). 
 7. But see Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 (1972).  There are other examples as well.  The point here is that as a whole, scholarship 
defending originalism has been very focused on a certain set of issues and cases, which by and 
large does not include foreign affairs. The leading works on originalism—such as ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (1990)—say nothing about foreign affairs.  For more examples and further discussion of this 
point, see infra text accompanying notes 26–106. 
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foreign affairs may be an area in which original understanding is particularly 
hard to discern and in which the constitutional text leaves many questions 
open.  All of these factors may generate difficulties for originalism in other 
areas of constitutional law,8 but the focus here is on foreign affairs and those 
who suggest, argue, or assume that originalism as a modern method of 
constitutional interpretation applies, full-force, in this context.9 
Originalists could, for the reasons canvassed above and described in 
greater detail below, clarify and strengthen their normative arguments if they 
focused greater attention on foreign affairs, particularly non-judicial 
constitutional interpretation, the relationship between executive and 
congressional power, and consequentialist problems.  Some originalists might 
argue that foreign affairs is largely the domain of constitutional construction, 
not interpretation.10  In this view, interpretation is limited to the original 
meaning of the text.11  But if original meaning does not resolve an issue with 
sufficient certainty, these theorists permit courts, the political branches, and/or 
the public as a whole to engage in “constitutional construction”12 or to apply 
“constitutional principles.”13  Thus, when original meaning of the text is vague, 
ambiguous,14 or otherwise under-determinative,15 these theories all permit the 
construction of the Constitution to adapt to the times.  In this way, originalism 
might work out some of the tension with foreign affairs, particularly if the 
constitutional text is vague or ambiguous with respect to some aspects of the 
relationship between Congress and the President.  This means in turn, 
however, that defining the point at which constitutional principles or 
construction becomes permissible is important to understanding the practical 
application of originalism to foreign affairs.  Unfortunately, this gate-keeping 
issue has received little attention from even those scholars who tout the limits 
 
 8. Some also reflect limitations on much constitutional theory, not just originalism. 
 9. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2; Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Making 
War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2007); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What 
the Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 48, 51 n.23 (2007); Ramsey, 
Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, supra note 2; John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of 
History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1221 (1999). 
 10. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). 
 11. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 118. 
 12. Id. at 121–28; WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 5–14. 
 13. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 304–05 
(2007). 
 14. See BARNETT, supra note 10, at 118–21 (explaining and distinguishing between “vague” 
and “ambiguous”). 
 15. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473–76 (1987) (explaining that some constitutional provisions are under-
determinative, but not indeterminate). 
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of originalism.  This neglect is lamentable from another perspective as well: if 
we shift focus from defending or attacking originalism and look instead at 
possible points of engagement between different interpretive views, this issue 
is significant.  If most everyone thinks that original meaning is important, 
originalism might offer some ways to understand exactly where its usefulness 
begins to drop off. 
For foreign relations scholars, particularly those focused on history, the 
intent of this contribution is to encourage greater engagement with the 
methodology of contemporary constitutional interpretation.  It may be that the 
debates in the field are largely about the content of history itself, not about 
what role history should play in modern interpretation.  To the extent we are 
concerned with how courts, Congress, and executive branch lawyers actually 
decide constitutional questions, however, it is not enough to simply describe 
history (original or otherwise); instead, we need an understanding or theory of 
why, how, and what kind of history is relevant. 
I.  ORIGINALISM(S) AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS 
“Originalism,” as used here, means the interpretation of the Constitution in 
accordance with the original public meaning of the text, unless that meaning 
cannot be determined with sufficient confidence.  This definition obviously 
glosses over many important fissures within originalism, including different 
views as to its proper object.16  Most contemporary originalists use original 
public meaning17—as opposed to the intent of the Framers or ratifiers—and 
this Article does as well.  Because there seems to be something approaching a 
consensus that the original meaning of constitutional text is, at least, an 
important part of interpretation,18 the focus here is on theories that require 
more—those that advance original public meaning as the preferred or 
 
 16. This use of the term “object” is from Berman.  Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk 
6–7 (July 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078933. 
 17. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–29 
(1999); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1186; 
Lawrence B. Solum & Robert W. Bennett, A Dialogue on Originalism Occasioned by Bennett’s 
Electoral College Reform Ain’t Easy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31, 41 (2006), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2006/4/LRColl2006n4Solum&Bennett.pdf 
(describing the move from original intent to original public meaning originalism as “a sort of 
Copernican revolution in constitutional theory”).  But see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (employing a 
hypothetical reconstruction of the meaning that a “reasonable” observer would have attributed to 
the Constitution in 1788). 
 18. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1085, 1086 (1989); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1745 
(1996). 
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exclusive tool of constitutional interpretation, unless that meaning is unclear.19  
Another point bears clarification: this paper is about how government officials 
and courts actually interpret the Constitution, and I use “originalism” to mean 
that they should do so according to the original public meaning of the 
document.20 
Because it is impossible to comprehensively analyze all of the work on 
originalism, this Article focuses on three normative defenses: the liberty-based 
justification for originalism advanced by Professor Barnett, the popular 
sovereignty account of Professor Whittington, and the pragmatic justification 
for originalism advanced by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport.  To be 
perfectly clear, the goal of the paper is not to critically evaluate these 
arguments in favor of originalism.  It is, instead, to apply these arguments to 
foreign affairs.  If, in other words, we lived in these originalist worlds, what 
would foreign affairs look like and why?21 
It may also be helpful to provide two examples of the kinds of 
constitutional questions that arise in foreign affairs.  For the first example, 
assume that historical research demonstrates that the original public meaning 
of the Declare War Clause was that Congress alone would have the authority to 
initiate hostilities through the use of force and that the President’s power was 
limited to responding to attacks on the United States.22  Assume further that the 
President has long used force abroad without the authorization of Congress in 
order to protect U.S. property, citizens, or interests.  For the second example, 
assume that the Constitution’s original public meaning was that sole executive 
agreements could not have force as domestic law.23  Assume further that sole 
 
 19. Finally, this Article is premised on a contested assumption: originalists bear the burden 
of persuasion.  Originalism is, generally speaking, not the way courts or the Executive Branch 
and Congress actually interpret the Constitution in the area of foreign affairs, so originalists have 
the burden of explaining why their approach should be adopted.  Cf. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of 
Law in Foreign Affairs, supra note 2, at 1474 (“Nonoriginalism is, as an initial problem, not a 
positive constitutional theory . . . .”).  Much of the most recent scholarship on originalism focuses 
in one way or another on whether originalists bear the burden and what the nature of that burden 
is.  See Berman, supra note 16, at 21–22, 69–79; Griffin, supra note 17, at 1197–1205. 
 20. Hence, to use Professor Solum’s language, this Article assumes that the “Constitution’s 
semantic content is fixed by facts at time of drafting and ratification” and asks how and why 
“constitutional practice” should be bound “by that content.”  Lawrence Solum, Colby & Smith on 
Originalism (and a Comment About the Meaning of Originalism), on Legal Theory Blog, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/02/thomas-colby-an.html (Feb. 15, 2008, 16:15 
EST). 
 21. This Article also puts aside questions of stare decisis. 
 22. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 60–116 (1974); 
Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE 
L.J. 672, 699–700 (1972).  Contra YOO, supra note 2, at 143–55. 
 23. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. 
REV. 133, 173–83 (1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
10 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:5 
executive agreements have long been used to settle claims against foreign 
nations and that sometimes these agreements displace state law (i.e., have 
domestic legal effect).24  A President bound by originalism in the interpretation 
of his own constitutional authority would, in the first example, not be able to 
use force to protect U.S. property abroad.  An originalist court, in the second 
example, could not give domestic legal effect to the sole executive agreement. 
A. Originalism: Just for Courts? 
Keith Whittington describes the originalism of the 1970s and 1980s as: 
a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and 
then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts; originalism was largely 
developed as a mode of criticism of those actions.  Above all, originalism was 
a way of explaining what the Court had done wrong, and what it had done 
wrong in this context was primarily to strike down government actions in the 
name of individual rights.25 
This version of originalism, with its focus on restraining courts, judicial 
deference to legislative majorities, and attacking cases like Roe and 
Griswold,26 seems at least partially beside the point for foreign affairs.27  Many 
of the most important foreign affairs issues are, at least currently, resolved 
largely outside the courts by the Executive Branch and Congress—for example 
the relative power of each branch to initiate war—and the principles of judicial 
restraint seem ill-suited to fully resolve issues raised by cases such as 
Youngstown, Dames & Moore, and Garamendi.28  This is so in part because 
the goal of judicial restraint does not itself tell us anything about the 
relationship between executive and legislative power.29  Perhaps originalism 
does not apply to the President’s interpretation of his power, but it seems 
incongruous to argue that the President is not bound to use originalism to 
 
 24. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324, 330–31 (1937). 
 25. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601 (2004) 
(footnote omitted); see also John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2003). 
 26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see BORK, supra note 7, at 153–55, 161–
67; Edwin Meese III, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers 
Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 26–29 (1985); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 545, 550–54 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
854 (1989); Whittington, supra note 25, at 602–03. 
 27. See generally Balkin, supra note 13, at 308 (arguing that “[f]rom the perspective of 
[theories of judicial restraint], non-judicial interpreters are marginal or exceptional cases that we 
explain in terms of the standard case of judicial interpretation”). 
 28. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 29. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Originalism?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 353, 359–60 
(2008). 
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interpret the scope of his own power but the courts must use originalism when 
they interpret the President’s power.30 
When early originalists turned their attention to foreign affairs, as Edwin 
Meese did in 1988, some sounded themes that would become the staple of 
future originalist foreign affairs scholarship: executive primacy and the limited 
(or non-existent) role that the courts should play in policing the boundary 
between executive and legislative authority.31  But this work either ignored 
original understanding at all32 or seemed to take as its starting point that the 
political branches should be bound by original meaning, rather than really 
defending this proposition.33  Other originalists have reached opposite 
historical conclusions. Raoul Berger, an influential original intent originalist,34 
extensively canvassed original history and concluded that the President’s 
contemporary power over foreign affairs is far greater than what the Framers 
and ratifiers intended; he thus argued that “[i]f present exigencies demand a 
redistribution of powers in which Congress was originally fully to share,” then 
“that decision ought candidly to be submitted to the people in the form of a 
proposed amendment.”35  Indeed, to this extent, Berger does not fit 
Whittington’s description: Berger did argue that “[t]he Court has not shrunk 
from taking over the functions of a legislature,” but he also maintained that in 
 
 30. Berman makes a similar point: 
Accordingly, proponents of judicial Originalism who rely on arguments that would not 
themselves support universal Originalism (intentionalists being the most obvious counter-
example) must explain how such cross-fertilization can proceed when different 
interpreters are entitled to rely on significantly different interpretive methodologies or, 
alternatively, why there should be—even how there could be—something closer to 
acoustic separation between judicial and extra-judicial constitutional exegesis. 
Berman, supra note 16, at 25–26.  A recently published essay by Michael Ramsey considers the 
reverse proposition: the President is bound by originalism, but the courts are not.  See Ramsey, 
supra note 29. 
 31. Edwin Meese, III, Constitutional Fidelity and Foreign Affairs, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 
224–25, 229 (1988); accord Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 695, 700–01 (1990). 
 32. See Bork, supra note 31. 
 33. See Meese, supra note 31, at 228–29.  Meese appears to suggest that the political 
branches should follow original meaning—and that Congress should accordingly “respect 
executive prerogatives concerning the conduct of foreign policy”—because if Congress did so, 
courts would have fewer cases to decide.  Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original 
Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 12 (1988).  Here, the desire to limit the work of the courts 
is the engine driving the analysis of how Congress and the Executive Branch should behave. 
 34. Johnathan G. O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 253, 253, 255 (2001). 
 35. Berger, supra note 7, at 54; accord Lofgren, supra note 22. 
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the context of foreign affairs the Court “with excessive modesty . . . abdicates 
its main function—policing of constitutional boundaries.”36 
Theories of originalism began to shift focus in the late 1980s and the 
1990s.37  In 1986, Antonin Scalia argued that originalists should identify their 
doctrine as concerned with original meaning instead of original intent.38  As 
Professor Solum describes, many theorists soon adopted this approach, and the 
“new originalism” which emerged has as its “core idea” the view “that the 
original meaning of the [C]onstitution is the original public meaning of the 
constitutional text.”39  In Whittington’s view, new originalism is also “an 
argument about what judges are supposed to be interpreting and what that 
implies, rather than an argument about how best to limit judicial discretion.”40  
To the extent this description is accurate,41 this shift might mean that the new 
originalism holds more promise for those seeking answers to foreign affairs 
questions.  Yet two features of most contemporary originalism suggest that its 
relevance to such questions may remain modest. 
First, as Whittington’s phrase “what judges are supposed to do” suggests, 
originalism seems to remain largely (in practice if not in theory) about the 
actions of judges, as opposed to the Legislature or executive branch officials.  
Professor Berman refers to this as the “subjects” of originalism—“[m]any 
originalist theses concern only how judges should act; they are agnostic 
regarding how other readers should interpret the Constitution.”42  Berman 
defines contemporary originalism as addressing “what courts must do, not 
what all interpreters must do.”43 
Whittington, a prominent new originalist, at times appears to explicitly 
limit his defense of originalism to “constitutional interpretation by the 
judiciary,”44 although elsewhere he is less clear.45  And Whittington writes 
that: 
 
 36. Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 NW. U. 
L. REV. 577, 625–26 (1980). 
 37. See Whittington, supra note 25; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 13–21 (U. 
Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
 38. Solum, supra note 37, at 18. 
 39. Id. at 19. 
 40. Whittington, supra note 25, at 609. 
 41. Cf. Balkin, supra note 13, at 308 (arguing that contemporary originalism improperly 
focuses on judicial restraint). 
 42. Berman, supra note 16, at 11. 
 43. Id. at 25. 
 44. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at xi, 160. 
 45. “Although the judicial obligation to engage in constitutional interpretation is not unique 
to the courts, since each branch is bound by the sovereign will . . . .”  Id. at 153; see also id. at 
135–36. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] AN ORIGINALISM FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 13 
[A] great deal of the originalism debate is driven by a particular concern with 
the work of judges and how best to justify and guide their decisions to lay 
aside the public policies endorsed by elected representatives.  The originalism 
debate speaks to the nature of constitutional interpretation generally, but it is 
particularly motivated by and concerned with constitutional interpretation 
within a very specific institutional context.  For both originalists and their 
critics, competing understandings about constitutional authority underwrite the 
institutional authority of the judiciary to speak for the text and the particular 
approaches to constitutional interpretation that the courts might employ.46 
Less explicitly, Randy Barnett begins his book, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution, with the observation that “[h]ad judges done their job, this book 
would not need to be written.”47  Barnett’s book targets judicial review of state 
and federal laws and argues that the judicial “presumption of constitutionality” 
applied to acts of Congress is wrong and should be replaced instead with a 
“presumption of liberty.”48  Again, foreign affairs issues are frequently 
resolved by the political branches, wholly or partially outside the courts,49 and 
thus originalism (as theororized by Whittington and others) may have little to 
say about them.50 
Second, an originalism focused on the courts—and individual rights51—
may not have much to say about separation of powers as between Congress 
 
 46. Keith E. Whittington, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 365, 375 
(2005) (book review). 
 47. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 1. 
 48. Id. at 151–353. 
 49. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 
1996); Flaherty, supra note 2; John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in 
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of 
Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993); Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign 
Affairs, supra note 2, at 1474. 
 50. There is voluminous literature on constitutional interpretation outside the courts.  See, 
e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829 
(2001); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional 
Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1359–78 (2001); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The 
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1274–79 (1996); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221–22 (1994); James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2000) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS (1999)). 
 51. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 727 (1988) (“For most commentators, the civil liberties area has been the battleground 
on which the original understanding debate has been fought.”). 
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and the President.52  This is not necessarily so, but if the project of originalism 
is to provide a theory of why courts are permitted to strike down statutes, for 
example, that theory may not help us figure out when the President’s power to 
act ends and that of Congress begins, because in either case the courts are 
reviewing the actions of a democratically accountable actor.  As it turns out, 
however, both Barnett and Whittington argue that originalism is required of all 
government officials, although precisely why this is so and what it would 
actually mean is left somewhat unclear.  They also both at least seem to 
suggest that the courts should play a strong role in policing the limits the 
Constitution places on government authority, and separation of powers issues 
are not identified as exceptions. 
1. Barnett 
Professor Barnett argues that “political actors,” including judges, may not 
“disregard” the original limits that a written Constitution places on their 
authority, because if they do so the Constitution’s legitimacy is undermined.53  
This defense of originalism requires that the original, written constitution be 
“legitimate”54 to begin with.55  A constitution is legitimate, in turn, if it ensures 
that every law restricting freedom is “necessary to protect the rights of others 
without improperly violating the rights of those whose freedom is being 
restricted.”56  If the Constitution is legitimate in this sense, we are bound by 
the laws created pursuant to its terms; the lawmaking process, which provides 
legitimacy to the commands of government officials, must be preserved or 
“locked in” through originalist interpretation of the written text.57 
This definition of legitimacy, as well as the justification for originalism 
that follows, seem to have nothing specific to say about separation of powers 
between the President and Congress, except to the extent such actions have an 
impact on freedom.  To take our first example, some offensive uses of military 
force by the President acting alone might intrude upon the power of Congress 
 
 52. Robert Bork describes The Tempting of America as a book about “the tendency of the 
judiciary to invade the province of the legislature” and notes that foreign affairs is a different area 
of separation of powers.  Bork, supra note 31, at 695 (citing BORK, supra note 7). 
 53. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 109–10, 116–17.  Barnett also argues that “practical 
considerations” are enough to justify originalism.  Id. at 109. 
 54. Barnett obviously uses the term in a normative sense.  A “legitimate lawmaking process 
is one that provides adequate assurances the laws it validates are just.”  Id. at 48. 
 55. See Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a 
Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 849–52 (2005) (book review) (discussing this 
aspect of Barnett’s argument). 
 56. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 9–10, 44–45, 48, 276. 
 57. Id. at 4, 103–13, 116–17. 
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to “Declare War,” but not “restrict freedom.”58 Therefore, adherence to 
original meaning seems unnecessary as legitimacy does not depend upon 
“locking in” this feature of the Constitution.  In other words, this argument is 
unavoidably linked to the content of the Constitution that ensures legitimacy.  
The “lock in” argument simply does not explain why we need originalism with 
respect to features of the Constitution that need not be locked in. 
Barnett apparently disagrees; he argues that once the Constitution is 
deemed “good enough” (i.e., it is legitimate), then it is necessary to “lock in” 
the entire document.59  Even assuming that this follows,60 Barnett’s approach 
requires the President to adhere to original meaning not because the 
Constitution is “good enough” in terms of how it defines presidential power, 
but instead based on the merits of other aspects of the Constitution—namely 
those that relate to individual freedom. 
Although Barnett seems to acknowledge that some structural features of 
the Constitution must be locked in although they do not protect liberty,61 he 
might argue that the decision to commit troops or otherwise use force does 
infringe upon liberty because it requires individual members of the armed 
forces to take particular actions.  It is unclear, though, how the liberty-based 
rights that Barnett describes would work in the context of voluntary military 
service and for uses of military force (launching a missile) that involve little or 
no immediate risk to our own armed forces.  In any event, if liberty is 
implicated in the decision to use force, this raises other questions, as 
consideration of the second example illustrates. 
 
 58. See id. at 49–52.  If actions of the President are excluded, then the difficulty is that 
Barnett’s theory does not apply to a whole category of government action—one that is 
particularly important in foreign affairs. 
 59. Id. at 110–13, 277; see also id. at 48 (“A law that violates principles of federalism may 
be improper even though it does not infringe upon . . . rights . . . .”). 
 60. Barnett argues that this follows from the “writtenness” of the Constitution.  He offers at 
least three ways in which legitimacy and writtenness are related.  “First, constitutional legitimacy 
depends on what the writing says.”  Id. at 116–17.  “Second, assuming that the lawmaking 
process initially established by the written constitution is legitimate . . . [the] writing helps assure 
that the[] provisions will be respected over time.”  Id. at 117.  Neither helps here.  Third, 
however, Barnett also suggests that legitimacy itself requires a commitment to writtenness: 
“[D]eviations from the original meaning of a written constitution will undermine the legitimacy 
of a lawmaking process, one of whose components is the commitment to a written constitution.”  
Id. at 110 n.60.  Given the underlying definition of legitimacy, it is still unclear (at least to this 
reader) why writtenness must preserve the original meaning of the Constitution in ways unrelated 
to individual freedom.  Barnett also describes the benefits of writings—such as notice and 
clarity—that are only preserved if we adhere to the original meaning of the writing.  But to this 
calculus we might add the disadvantages of writings; in other words, this seems to shift to a 
consequentialist defense of originalism.  See infra Part I.B. 
 61. See BARNETT, supra note 10, at 48, 110–13, 277. 
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What does Barnett’s theory provide with respect to the second example, 
which involved presidential lawmaking?  This, too, must be teased out, as 
Barnett does not address this kind of issue directly.  The deprivation of 
property is involved, and executive actions seem to qualify as “law,”62 thus 
enforcement of the sole executive agreement must be both “necessary” and 
“proper.”63  Although these requirements would seem (based on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause) to apply only to acts of Congress, Barnett acknowledges 
that he uses these terms somewhat differently from their meaning in the 
Constitution.64  “A ‘proper’ exercise of power is one that is within the 
jurisdiction of the branch or department in question . . . .”65  As, per our 
hypothetical, this sole executive agreement is beyond the power of the 
President acting alone (thus presumably not within the President’s 
“jurisdiction”), it would not be “proper.”  Perhaps these actions by the 
President do not constitute “law” at all and thus stand outside Barnett’s 
argument.  If so, it is unclear that the arguments Barnett advances in favor of 
originalism apply to presidential actions. 
Barnett explicitly rejects any argument that originalism requires the 
political question doctrine66 and would apparently apply a presumption of 
liberty in this context, making it difficult for the President to prevail.  
Congressional executive agreements would share the same fate (assuming they 
are inconsistent with the original public meaning of the Constitution67).  More 
so than the presidential initiation of war, these results are understandable from 
an individual liberties perspective because insisting upon the lawmaking 
procedures provided in the original Constitution makes it more difficult to 
deprive people of property.  Nevertheless, abandoning the political question 
doctrine, employing a “presumption of liberty” in the context of foreign affairs, 
and strict enforcement by the court of the constitutional boundaries between 
executive and legislative powers could radically transform foreign affairs and 
dramatically reduce the power of the President while enhancing that of the 
courts—all which goes entirely unnoticed in Barnett’s book. 
 
 62. See id. at 49–52. 
 63. Id. at 51 (“[A] law must be both necessary to the protection of the rights of others and 
proper insofar as it does not violate the rights of those upon whom it is imposed . . . .”). 
 64. Id. at 47–48. 
 65. Id. at 274. 
 66. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 128–30. 
 67. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 703, 764 (2002) (“[W]hile scholars vigorously disagree about whether 
congressional-executive agreements may be legitimately used today, few would disagree that the 
original meaning of the Constitution prohibited them.”). 
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2. Whittington 
Whittington’s work on originalism is also largely concerned with judicial 
review,68 but his defense of originalism is ultimately based on popular 
sovereignty and consent, which Barnett rejects.69  Whittington argues that the 
Constitution is authoritative because it is a product of the sovereign will, which 
must be distinguished from the government itself.70  “‘[T]he people,’ in their 
sovereign capacity”—i.e. in a constitutional convention—”do not always 
exist,”71 and when they do not, “the only available expression of the sovereign 
will is the constitutional text.”72  All branches of government are bound by this 
expression of sovereign will; originalism is required so that the text operates as 
a “constraint” on the people’s agents.73  Many disagree, of course, that the 
need for constraint requires originalism.74  The point here, however, is that 
despite the focus on judicial review, Whittington’s theory actually obligates all 
three branches to engage in constitutional interpretation (and presumably to 
limit their power as required by originalist interpretation), because all are by 
bound the constitutional text as the expression of sovereign will.75 
With respect to extrajudicial interpretation, the theory becomes somewhat 
unclear.  According to Whittington, “government agents”—apparently this 
includes Congress and the President—enjoy two sorts of political authority.76  
First, “[t]hey are chosen by and responsible to the electorate . . . to ensure . . . 
the public good”; second, “they are empowered by the sovereign people to use 
 
 68. Whittington has also written extensively on constitutional construction, which is not 
concerned with judicial review.  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). 
 69. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 9.  This Article puts aside Whittington’s argument based on 
the written nature of the Constitution, WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 50–61, which seems 
largely directed to the courts.  It is the discussion of popular sovereignty that best engages the 
questions posed at the beginning of this Article. 
 70. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 110–13, 124–27. 
 71. Id. at 135. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 56. 
 74. Berman, supra note 16, at 61–63; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Early 
Interpretations & Original Sins, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2005, 2009–13 (1997). 
 75. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 153 (“[T]he judicial obligation to engage in 
constitutional interpretation is not unique to the courts, since each branch is bound by the 
sovereign will . . . .”); id. at 136 (“The text alone is present in normal politics, and therefore no 
organ of the government is authorized to speak in the name of the people.  The sovereign people 
are not present.”); id. at 159 (“[A]lthough government officials are legally bound by the terms of 
the Constitution, they are only contingently constrained by the terms of constitutional 
constructions.”); see also id. at 56 (“The people can constrain their governmental agents only by 
fixing their will in an unchanging text.”). 
 76. Id. at 135. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
18 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:5 
the resources of government to fulfill specified ends.”77  Judges, by contrast, 
have only the second sort of political authority, which means they are limited 
to enforcing the Constitution itself: “The judiciary’s particular claim to 
authority can come only from the accuracy of its efforts to interpret the 
Constitution.”78 
Whittington does not, however, directly answer some of the questions that 
this arrangement poses.  For example, what is the relationship between 
constitutional interpretation by the political branches and that of the courts?79  
Whittington says that “the judiciary . . . is functionally elevated above the other 
branches in terms of its specialized capacity to interpret [sovereign] will.”80  
Courts, on this account, serve as “neutral arbiters” while government officials 
are “interested parties in disputes over constitutional meaning.”81  Should 
courts accordingly refuse to defer to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of 
the Constitution?82  Indeed, despite the reasons he gives here to be skeptical of 
constitutional interpretation by the other branches, elsewhere Whittington 
emphasizes the limitations and weaknesses of the courts, defends extrajudicial 
constitutional interpretation, and suggests a complicated relationship between 
interpretation by the courts and that of the political branches.83  The work on 
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation does not, however, discuss 
originalism. 
Whittington also emphasizes at length that the sovereign will of the people 
must be preserved through a fixed text that limits the power of government.84  
Must the judiciary always enforce the sovereign will in this way?  In other 
words, to take the first example from the beginning of this paper, if originalist 
analysis shows—to the requisite level of certainty—that Congress alone has 
the power to initiate hostilities, must the courts step in to prevent the President 
from using troops for this purpose?  If Congress does nothing and the President 
exceeds the limits of the authority he is given by the sovereign will of the 
people, how can the courts legitimately fail to act?  Whittington suggests a 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 154; see also id. at 46, 56–57, 152–59. 
 79. Cf. William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. L.J. 1333, 
1335 (2006) (questioning how the Executive and Legislative Branches should interpret the 
Constitution). 
 80. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 153. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 154 (“Such arguments do not support a unique capacity in the courts to engage in 
constitutional interpretation, but they do indicate a special obligation by the courts to interpret the 
fundamental law and particular reason for respecting their judgment.”). 
 83. See Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections 
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002) (“The authority to interpret the Constitution is 
shared by multiple institutions and actors within our political system, and tends to flow among 
them over time rather than remain fixed in a stable hierarchical or segmented distribution.”). 
 84. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 56. 
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strong role for the courts.  He writes: “Interpretative approaches that allow 
judicial restraint in relation to some parts of the text implicitly assert that the 
other branches of government directly embody the deliberate popular will 
relative to those aspects of the text.”85  If other branches disregard the 
constitutional limitations on their own authority, and the courts employ 
“judicial restraint,” then “consensual . . . government is undermined, replaced 
with a selective reordering of constitutional values by government officials 
who claim an authority superior to the fundamental law under which they hold 
their offices.”86 
Finally, the relationship between construction and interpretation is not 
entirely clear.  Because interpretation of the text is the effectuation of the 
sovereign will, while constitutional construction is not, it seems that courts 
must not rely on the latter when doing the former.  Yet Whittington is open to a 
flexible relationship between the interpretive work of the political branches 
and that of the courts.87  It seems, however, that when courts are engaged in 
interpretation, while they might be able to defer to the Executive Branch’s 
interpretation of the Constitution, they must be quite careful to distinguish 
between that and construction by the Executive Branch.  This appears to be an 
especially awkward and difficult inquiry for the courts, and one that could 
substantially complicate the application of originalism to foreign affairs. 
B. Originalism and Outcomes 
Originalism is also sometimes defended on pragmatic or consequentialist 
grounds.  Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, for example, argue that because 
the Constitution was enacted by supermajoritarian rules, there are strong 
reasons to think that its provisions will have “good consequences” that are 
“socially desirable.”88  Judges should adhere to original meaning (including the 
Framers’ own “interpretative rules”) in order to sustain and preserve these 
good consequences.89  This defense of originalism does not tell us how the 
political branches should behave—although presumably they must adhere to 
the original text, too, for the same reasons. 
Would McGinnis and Rappaport endorse a strong role for the courts to 
enforce the boundaries between executive and congressional authority, if this is 
necessary to preserve the results of supermajoritarian deliberation that is 
 
 85. Id. at 155.  Whittington does elsewhere discuss the political question doctrine, apparently 
sanctioning its use when “traditional tools of interpretation . . . could not penetrate to the core of 
the debate and decisively settle [the] controvers[y].”  WHITTINGTON, supra note 68, at 154. 
 86. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 155. 
 87. See Whittington, supra note 83, at 848. 
 88. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (2007). 
 89. Id. at 384, 389–91. 
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memorialized in the Constitution?  They may believe that the Framers’ own 
interpretative rules foreclose a strong judicial role in foreign affairs, but what if 
that is unclear or wrong?90  And what if courts are poorly suited to enforce 
boundaries between the branches today? 
More broadly, what if originalist interpretation leads to really bad 
contemporary results?  The authors consider this kind of objection briefly at 
the end of the paper, noting that even if critics point to “a constitutional 
provision that is widely believed to be defective,” such a provision does not 
undermine their argument “that the Constitution taken as a whole is of high-
enough quality that its original meaning should be enforced.”91  This response 
would seem to hinge, however, on the importance of the provision in question.  
Their example is the provision that prevents foreign-born citizens from 
becoming President, but as Professor Jefferson Powell has put it: “In the area 
of foreign affairs . . . the interpretations we give the Constitution can implicate 
the survival of the Republic itself.”92  What if the provision that leads to bad 
results is one that relates to national security, and it poses a substantial threat to 
the nation itself?  In this situation, it seems hard to defend an original 
construction of the Constitution as a whole on consequentialist grounds.93 
Foreign affairs is indeed cited by others as a context in which originalism 
should be rejected on consequentialist grounds.  Professors Posner and 
Vermeule reject originalism during times of crises (which has some, albeit 
imperfect, overlap with foreign affairs), based on the high decision costs of 
originalist reasoning (hard to do, requires painstaking historical research) 
which are more harmful during emergencies when delay is more costly.94  
Also, during emergencies the benefits of history are lower, and the costs of 
tying judges to history are higher because emergencies come from 
unanticipated events and need experimental, creative, forward-looking 
policy.95  Finally, historical changes since the framing, including an increase in 
 
 90. David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145 
(2008). 
 91. Id. at 396. 
 92. H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1999); see also Treanor, supra note 79, at 1333 (“Few 
areas of constitutional law have produced as much heated debate as the war powers area, heat 
produced in no small part by the passionate belief that this is a subject of incalculable 
consequence.”). 
 93. McGinnis & Rappaport may not think that applying originalism in the context of foreign 
affairs leads to bad results.  But it seems that the success of their argument depends upon a 
particular concept of foreign affairs at the framing—one that continues to lead to good results 
today. 
 94. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies: A Reply to Lawson, 
87 B.U. L. REV. 313, 319 (2007). 
 95. Id. at 319–20; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 
(2006). 
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the power of the presidency96 and of the United States,97 as well as changes in 
international law98 and the conduct of war, may all work to make originalism 
unattractive in the area of foreign affairs, especially to pragmatists.  Although 
stare decisis, which is defended by some originalists, might help answer these 
concerns, foreign affairs, as described above, lack judicial precedent in many 
important areas of interpretation. 
C. Original Uncertainty & Changes over Time 
History itself has always posed a variety of threats to originalism.99  These 
threats may, depending on your view of history, be enhanced in the context of 
foreign affairs.  Some have argued that this is an area in which the original 
meaning of constitutional text is especially hard to determine.100  Certain 
textual commitments of authority—like the power to make “Rules concerning 
Captures on Land and Water” and to “grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal”101—not only refer to things whose original meanings are difficult to 
understand at all in modern terms, but also to things that went virtually 
unnoticed during the framing of the Constitution.102 
Second, even if we are able to determine the original meaning of the text, 
that text still may not answer many foreign affairs questions.103  Examples may 
(depending on your view of the Constitution’s text) include the power to 
terminate treaties,104 the status of non-treaty international agreements, and 
whether or not the President has primary, exclusive power in the area of 
foreign affairs.105  As Martin Flaherty observes, “[p]recisely because the 
Founding generation had resolved so little, rather than so much,” key 
 
 96. Monaghan, supra note 51, at 736–37; see WHITTINGTON, supra note 68, at 159–62; G. 
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (1999). 
 97. See Monaghan, supra note 51, at 736. 
 98. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism: 
International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2683 (2005). 
 99. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 100. See Flaherty, supra note 2, at 171. 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 102. See Treanor, supra note 79, at 1339–40 (arguing that the Declare War Clause “was not a 
first order issue for” the Framers and that, therefore, “they fashioned a text that neither fully 
captured their intentions nor resolved the types of issues that have become pressing to us”). 
 103. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 201 
(5th rev. ed. 1984); HENKIN, supra note 49, at 14–15. 
 104. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), 
vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 105. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 92. 
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constitutional questions have been “worked out over time by the three branches 
in light of the likely consequences,” and although this “result also frequently 
obtains in domestic constitutional issues, in foreign affairs it is close to 
systemic.”106  Not everyone agrees with this assessment of history;107 to the 
extent it is correct, however, originalism would seem to provide fewer answers 
to constitutional questions. 
II.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ORIGINALISM: ANSWERS? 
A. Answers from Originalism: Constitutional Construction & Principles 
Several developments in originalist theory might smooth out the 
relationship with foreign affairs.  In particular, originalists have increasingly 
acknowledged that original meaning does not fully resolve all questions about 
the Constitution, because the text can be both vague and ambiguous.108  As an 
example, the 1988 Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation provided that 
government lawyers should make their arguments to courts based on original 
understanding: 
[C]onstitutional language should be construed as it was publicly understood at 
the time of its drafting and ratification and government attorneys should 
advance constitutional arguments based only on this “original meaning.”  To 
do this, government attorneys should attempt to construct arguments based 
solely on the ordinary usage of the words at the time the provision at issue was 
ratified. . . . Where the text of a particular provision is ambiguous or vague, 
arguments may then be premised on the structure of the government as defined 
elsewhere in the text of the Constitution, and on other sources indicating the 
intent of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified that provision (i.e., the 
Founders).  It should be remembered, however, that the aim of any extratextual 
analysis is only to elucidate the meaning of the actual constitutional text at 
issue.109 
Today’s originalists like Barnett, Whittington, and Professor Balkin would 
not agree.  All acknowledge that original meaning sometimes runs out, and 
then someone (e.g., a judge, executive branch official, the general public) does 
something else; Barnett and Whittington call the something else “constitutional 
 
 106. Flaherty, supra note 2, at 171–72 (footnote omitted); accord EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957).  Contra RAMSEY, 
supra note 5. 
 107. See RAMSEY, supra note 5. 
 108. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 118–30. 
 109. Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 547 n.13 (2006) (quoting Office of Legal Policy, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation 3–4 (Feb. 19, 1988), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/guidelines.pdf).  Earlier views of exclusivity: “The Constitution’s true 
meaning, based on its original understanding, should be the sole basis for court rulings.”  Edwin 
Meese III, A Return to the Founders, NAT’L L.J., June 28, 2004, at 22. 
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construction.”110  This has obvious importance for the first and second 
difficulties discussed in the preceding section: original public meaning may be 
under-determinative because the text in question is vague, ambiguous, or 
leaves gaps.  It may also ease some of the tension between Barnett’s and 
Whittington’s theories of originalism and foreign affairs; much of that tension 
is generated by executive power, about which neither says much of anything.  
Moreover, a sufficiently plastic originalism111 might permit outcomes that 
pragmatists think are correct. 
Consider the first example set out at the beginning of the paper, involving 
the President’s power to use force in light of the Declare War Clause.  
Assuming, as the first example does, that the original public meaning of the 
Declare War Clause was to give Congress (not the President) the power to 
initiate hostilities through the use of force, then Barnett’s theory requires 
adherence to original meaning—and thus may require fundamental changes to 
the current balance of power between Congress, the President, and the courts—
even when such adherence appears to have nothing to do with individual 
freedom.  Whittington’s theory appears to require the same result, which is 
related to the popular sovereignty rationale he advances.  The difficulty here is 
that the Executive Branch must also interpret the Constitution’s limits on its 
own authority, and it is unclear if (and why or why not) the courts are 
obligated to enforce the original boundaries of the President’s authority.  But 
each theory acknowledges that original meaning is sometimes under-
determinative; if that is the case with the Declare War Clause, then these 
results are not required.  Indeed, under these circumstances, the Executive 
Branch is not limited to originalism—constitutional construction “fills the 
unavoidable gaps in constitutional meaning when interpretation has reached 
it[s] limits.”112 
In other words, originalism works for foreign affairs because this area of 
constitutional law is so uncertain that originalism itself does not require 
originalism!  This leads to a vitally important question: What amount of under-
determinacy (and of what sort) permits construction?  This is an important 
 
 110. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 121; WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 158. 
 111. More precisely, it might not be that originalism itself is more plastic, but instead that it 
simply requires less. 
Although originalists might well insist that the proper goal of those interpreting the 
Constitution is to realize the meaning that was imbued in that text by the founders, they 
should also recognize that such interpretive efforts will not exhaust what can be done with 
the text.  Originalists qua originalists are only concerned with the bare minimum of how 
we must live if we are to adhere to the requirements of the Constitution.  That bare 
minimum may be easy or hard to satisfy, but it is what the Constitution was written to 
demand of government officials. 
Whittington, supra note 46, at 380. 
 112. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 121. 
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question for understanding the requirements of originalism in foreign affairs, at 
least for these theorists.  Moreover, to the extent those theories are premised 
(implicitly or explicitly) on good outcomes, drawing this line might be 
extremely important to evaluating those theories.  Yet on this point, they say 
very little. 
Barnett tells us that where the constitutional text is genuinely vague or 
where “the limits of historical inquiry” are reached, construction can begin.113  
Is the Executive Vesting Clause “genuinely vague?”  Does interpretation of the 
Declare War Clause exceed the limits of historical inquiry?  The first question 
seems almost as difficult as figuring the scope of the Vesting Clause itself; 
both seem to assume that Barnett’s terms are self-executing and easy to apply, 
but they are not. 
Although Professor Balkin’s defense of originalism was not discussed 
above, it bears mention that his puts a great deal of pressure on this question as 
well.  He distinguishes between text that is “rule-like, concrete and specific” 
and that which is “abstract, general or offers a standard.”114  For the first, we115 
are limited to the original meaning of the words.116  For the second, however, 
we can resort to underlying principles.117  Again, to understand whether the 
Executive Vesting Clause is “abstract” and “general,” or “concrete” and 
“specific” is quite possibly as difficult as deciding whether the clause includes 
any foreign affairs powers.  Construction and underlying principles might 
resolve many of the tensions between originalism and foreign affairs, basically 
by concluding that originalism does not apply in this area.  To know that, 
however, would require a much more robust understanding of the 
preconditions for the resort to construction and underlying principles. 
Whittington’s discussion of constitutional construction illustrates this point 
with respect to both examples raised at the beginning of this paper.  
Whittington lists “executive agreements” as an example of constitutional 
 
 113. Id.  When restating the conditions under which construction is appropriate, Barnett does 
not mention the “limits of historical inquiry.”  Id. at 126. 
 114. Balkin, supra note 13, at 305. 
 115. Balkin explicitly expands the subjects of originalism beyond the courts, to the people.  
Id. at 308. 
 116. Id. at 305. 
 117. Id.  Balkin explains the application of this theory to abortion in great detail.  Indeed, a 
significant advantage of his version of originalism is that it permits the interpretation of the 
Constitution to respond to “social movements and political mobilizations.”  Id. at 300–03.  He 
does not explicitly address how this theory applies to change generated in other ways—through 
the practice of the Executive Branch, for example—although he does note that these precedents 
are “entitled to considerable weight.”  Id. at 306.  The focus of Balkin’s article is not so much 
providing a normative reason in favor of originalism (although he does do this at the outset of the 
paper), but more applying it to abortion.  For these reasons, his work was not discussed in detail 
at the beginning of the paper. 
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construction at the outset of his book on this topic.118  Yet there is strong 
evidence that the original understanding of the Constitution would not permit 
such agreements to have domestic legal effect.119  Why, then, is this an 
appropriate area for “constitutional construction?”  Whittington does not 
discuss the relevant history or constitutional text.  Whittington also uses war 
powers as an example of constitutional construction, in particular the War 
Powers Act of 1973.  First noting the “judicial restraint” in the areas of foreign 
affairs and war powers, which he traces back to the Curtiss-Wright opinion, 
Whittington goes on to describe what he terms “executive aggrandizement of 
warmaking powers . . . after World War II.”120  This is followed by an 
interesting discussion of how Congress and the President understood the 
Constitution during the debates around the War Powers Act.121  Here again, the 
turn away from original history seems to come very quickly and without 
discussion. 
Once the preconditions for moving beyond originalism are adequately 
defined, the questions become textual and historical: Are the relevant foreign 
affairs provisions actually indeterminate according to whatever standard 
applies?  This question leads back to history. 
B. Answers from Text and History 
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown has been described as one that is 
“often seen among the most anti-originalist opinions in the modern canon.”122  
It is also frequently described as functionalist, not formalist.123  But as it turns 
out, it is hard to find contemporary originalists who are explicitly critical of 
it.124  Indeed, Professor Paulsen defends a somewhat modified version of 
Jackson’s opinion in exactly the same way that the originalists above sanction 
non-originalist reasoning: he concludes that Jackson’s approach is appropriate 
when the “Constitution’s text, structure and histor[y]” do not yield a 
“satisfactorily clear” “‘right’ answer,” or when the situation “involves 
overlapping spheres of authority.”125  Again, and for the same reasons as 
 
 118. WHITTINGTON, supra note 68, at 12. 
 119. Ramsey, supra note 23, at 218–31. 
 120. WHITTINGTON, supra note 68, at 174. 
 121. Id. at 174–75. 
 122. Flaherty, supra note 2, at 172; see also RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 53 (noting that Jackson 
did not “grapple[] with how the Constitution’s text originally allocated foreign affairs power”). 
 123. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 442 
(2007); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1522–31, 1527 n.55, 1528 n.59 (1991). 
 124. John Yoo refers to “fans of Youngstown,” suggesting that he is not one, but he does not 
make the disagreement explicit.  John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2005–2006, at 83, 97 (Mark K. Moller ed., 2006). 
 125. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 229–30. 
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discussed above, if a criterion like “satisfactorily clear” is going to do this 
much work in foreign affairs, we cannot really understand how originalism 
applies until it is defined more carefully. 
History can also partially resolve the tension between foreign affairs and 
originalism by demonstrating that the President had substantial foreign affairs 
power pursuant to the original meaning of the Constitution.  One difficulty for 
originalists is that the President’s actual power has expanded substantially 
since the framing, but if the Constitution sanctions that expansion, then the 
tension is minimized.  Originalists have indeed concluded that the President 
has broad power in foreign affairs, including “residual” or default power.  One 
potential source of such power is the Article II Vesting Clause, and another is 
the presidential oath.  The first has been comprehensively defended as a 
historical matter,126 while the second has not.127  The point here is that if one 
takes this particular view of history, originalism will be easier to defend in 
foreign affairs. 
Similarly, history and text might show that the Framers created a flexible 
approach to foreign affairs issues in which Congress and the President vie for 
power and the courts have a very limited role in foreign affairs.128  Professor 
Lawson reasons that “the best account of the Constitution’s original meaning” 
is a “deferential judicial role in crisis management.”129  This follows from the 
Article II Vesting Clause, which Lawson argues vests the President with a 
“package of powers” and includes the “principle of reasonableness,” which 
“essentially enshrines common sense into the law.”130  The reasonableness 
principle expands the deference afforded to the President during war and other 
emergencies.  It appears that originalism not only permits such deference, but 
compels it; this is also “precisely the deferential . . . role in crisis management 
that history has . . . produced.”131 
Putting aside the merits of these arguments, the point here is that if history 
and text point to a flexible arrangement of power consistent with the current 
practice by all three branches, then many of the potential objections to 
originalism are eliminated.  The two examples posed at the beginning of the 
paper, for instance, no longer hold, because the underlying assumptions about 
what history shows are wrong. 
 
 126. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).  Contra Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive 
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 592–626 (2004). 
 127. See Paulsen, supra note 50, at 257. 
 128. YOO, supra note 2, at 24. 
 129. Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times of 
Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 293 (2007). 
 130. Id. at 305–07; see also LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 55. 
 131. Lawson, supra note 129, at 293. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Some normative justifications for originalism fit uncomfortably with 
foreign affairs and frequently fail to answer the very questions that arise most 
often in this area.  Barnett’s theory appears (depending on your view of the 
original meaning of the text) to require significant changes to contemporary 
constitutional law of foreign relations, simply in order to lock in largely 
unrelated features of the Constitution.  Whittington’s theory tells us little about 
the line between interpretation and construction, and little about what the 
courts are supposed to be doing in relation to executive authority.  Moreover, 
the insistence on  “constitutional constraint[s]” on the “people’s agents” 
through a written text with a “fixed meaning” sits in uncomfortable 
juxtaposition with the quick move to constitutional construction in foreign 
affairs, and with little analysis of what that “fixed meaning” might have been.  
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport support originalism because it commits us 
to supermajoritarian text, but this consequentialist justification must pre-
suppose at least an acceptable allocation of foreign affairs power. 
 Ironically, some of the very things that make originalism difficult to 
apply to foreign affairs simultaneously steer foreign affairs back toward 
history.  The lack of judicial opinions in this area make issues of judicial 
review less pressing but also enhances the salience of history—both original 
and evolving.  History is essential to understanding the relationship between 
executive authority and war and the struggle and acquiescence of Congress vis-
à-vis the President.  And yet, even with history as the coin of the interpretive 
realm, originalism itself seems to be an awkward fit. 
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